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MISCONSTRUING WHISTLEBLOWER 
IMMUNITY UNDER THE DEFEND TRADE 
SECRETS ACT 
Peter S. Menell* 
In crafting the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), Congress went 
beyond the federalization of state trade secret protection to tackle a broader so-
cial justice problem: the misuse of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) to discour-
age reporting of illegal activity in a variety of areas. The past few decades have 
witnessed devastating government contracting abuses, regulatory violations, and 
deceptive financial schemes that have hurt the public and cost taxpayers and in-
vestors billions of dollars. Congress recognized that immunizing whistleblowers 
from the cost and risk of trade secret liability for providing information to the 
Government could spur law enforcement. But could this goal be accomplished 
without jeopardizing legitimate trade secret protection? 
I.   THE IMMUNITY SOLUTION 
Congress solved the problem through a true “cone of silence.” Congress 
immunized whistleblowers from liability under federal and state trade secret 
law for disclosure, in confidence, of trade secrets to government officials and 
attorneys for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of 
law. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, § 7 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1833(B)(1)(A) (2012)). By limiting disclosure to trusted intermediaries—
government officials bound by state and federal law to protect trade secrets and 
attorneys bound by confidentiality obligations—the DTSA whistleblower im-
munity regime promotes law enforcement without risking commercial harm to 
legitimate trade secret owners. 
Congress recognized that whistleblowers face dire risks of retaliation and 
costly legal expenses by even consulting with an attorney about allegedly ille-
gal activity by their employer. Hence, merely affording whistleblowers a de-
fense to liability for seeking to provide information about alleged misconduct 
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would do little to promote law enforcement. The mere risk of having to defend 
trade secret litigation, with its attendant legal costs and career repercussions, 
would discourage whistleblowers from coming forward or seeking legal coun-
sel. Instead, Congress chose to insulate whistleblowers from exposure to trade 
secret liability through an express grant of immunity. 
As Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Charles Grassley, a co-sponsor 
of the whistleblower immunity provision, explained, “Too often, individuals 
who come forward to report wrongdoing in the workplace are punished for 
simply telling the truth. The amendment I championed with Senator Leahy en-
sures that these whistleblowers won’t be slapped with allegations of trade se-
cret theft when responsibly exposing misconduct. It’s another way we can pre-
vent retaliation and even encourage people to speak out when they witness 
violations of the law.”1 
Senator Leahy added that “Whistleblowers serve an essential role in ensur-
ing accountability. It is important that whistleblowers have strong and effective 
avenues to come forward without fear of intimidation or retaliation. The 
amendment I authored with Senator Grassley takes another important step in 
our bipartisan efforts to protect whistleblowers and promote accountability.”2 
In immunizing whistleblowers from trade secret liability, Congress recog-
nized that whistleblowers serve as quasi-public actors -- private attorneys gen-
eral. Under the False Claims Act, for example, the whistleblowing “relator” 
acts in the name of the government. The relator’s counsel works in conjunction 
with government enforcers. The government obtains the recovery and rewards 
the relator a share for his or her assistance. In other types of whistleblower pro-
grams, such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act’s SEC and CFTC regimes, the whistleblower provides information in con-
fidence to the government and receives a reward if the government is success-
ful in recovering funds. 
By its essential nature, immunity extinguishes liability before litigation 
gets underway, just as a vaccine immunizes the patient against disease, and thus 
differs from a “defense” to liability. As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), a case applying qualified-immunity to a 
claim that a Secret Service agent had used excessive force in removing a pro-
tester, immunity is not a “mere defense” to liability but an “immunity from 
suit.” The Court stressed that immunity issues must be resolved as early as pos-
sible based on the public policies animating the grant of immunity. In the con-
text of qualified immunity, for example, the “concern of the immunity inquiry 
is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal con-
straints on particular police conduct.” Officers have difficulty in assessing the 
amount of force that is required in a particular circumstance. If their mistake as 
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to “what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the 
immunity defense.” In the DTSA context, the purpose of the immunity was to 
eliminate the need for a whistleblower to undergo the expense and strain of de-
fending a trade secret lawsuit.  
The DTSA whistleblower immunity went into effect on May 11, 2016, the 
day the DTSA was signed into law. The first reported decision applying the 
whistleblower immunity provision issued on December 6, 2016.3 Unfortunate-
ly, the court misconstrued the immunity provision, creating the very chilling 
effects that Congress mandated that the courts avoid. 
II.   UNUM GROUP V. LOFTUS 
According to the court’s background summary, Unum Group, a Fortune 
500 insurance company, hired Timothy Loftus in 1985. Unum promoted Loftus 
to Director of Disability Insurance Benefits in 2004. In September 2016, Un-
um’s in-house counsel interviewed Loftus as part of an internal investigation of 
claims practices. Later that week, Loftus removed several boxes of information 
and a laptop computer from the Unum offices after usual business hours. Unum 
requested that Loftus return these materials. Loftus refused to return the docu-
ments, although he did return the laptop. Through his counsel, Loftus informed 
Unum that the documents “may be evidence or otherwise have a material bear-
ing on certain matters which are the subject of both historical and current gov-
ernmental inquiries concerning the business practices of Unum” and that the 
documents had been secured to prevent their destruction “pending both internal 
and apparent external investigations of misconduct at Unum.” On October 21, 
2016, Loftus’ counsel informed Unum’s counsel that Loftus provided the doc-
uments to his counsel to obtain an “analysis of his legal position vis a vis his 
employer and the issue of his employer’s compliance with the regulatory set-
tlement agreement to which it was a party.” Nonetheless, Unum sued Loftus for 
federal and state trade secret misappropriation as well as state law conversion.  
This lawsuit presents a straightforward application of the whistleblower 
immunity provision, which provides in relevant part: 
(1) Immunity. An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly liable 
under any Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a trade se-
cret that 
(A) is made 
(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, 
either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and 
(ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected 
violation of law; or 
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(B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other 
proceeding, if such filing is made under seal.4 
Not only is the section specifically identified as “Immunity,” but the provi-
sion requires that employers notify employees of “the immunity set forth in this 
subsection.”5 Therefore, Loftus’ motion to dismiss the federal and state trade 
secret claims should have been granted. With dismissal of the trade secret 
claims, the state conversion claim loses its jurisdictional hook and likewise 
should have been dismissed. Furthermore, Loftus should have been awarded 
attorney’s fees for having to defend a bad faith misappropriation claim.6 
The court, however, misapprehended the DTSA whistleblower protection 
scheme. Rather than recognize that Loftus enjoyed immunity from liability, the 
court treated the whistleblower provision merely as an affirmative defense. The 
court declined to dismiss the trade secret misappropriation claim on the follow-
ing basis: 
While Loftus contends that he is entitled to immunity under the DTSA because 
he handed Unum’s documents over to his attorney to pursue legal action against 
Unum for alleged unlawful activities, the record lacks facts to support or reject 
his affirmative defense at this stage of litigation. There has been no discovery to 
determine the significance of the documents taken or their contents, and Loftus 
has not filed any potential lawsuit that could be supported by information in 
those documents. Further, it is not ascertainable from the complaint whether 
Loftus turned over all of Unum’s documents to his attorney, which documents 
he took and what information they contained, or whether he used, is using, or 
plans to use, those documents for any purpose other than investigating a poten-
tial violation of law. Taking all facts in the complaint as true, and making all 
reasonable inferences in favor of Unum, the court finds the complaint states a 
plausible claim for trade secret misappropriation and declines to dismiss [the 
trade secret misappropriation claims].7 
This is precisely the murky situation that Congress expressly corrected 
when it immunized employees and contractors. Notwithstanding that Unum 
provided no evidence that Loftus has done anything more than share company 
records with his counsel as part of an effort to investigate a suspected violation 
of law, the court nonetheless imposed upon Loftus the burden of proving that 
he did not have an improper purpose. In so doing, the court ignores the vaccine 
and subjects Loftus to the very disease that Congress cured: the imposition of 
substantial costs and adverse career repercussions by sharing, in confidence, 
company documents with counsel. Under the court’s approach, any trade secret 
owner can require a whistleblower to defend a trade secret lawsuit merely by 
alleging that there is a dispute over the employee’s motivation for providing 
trade secret documents to their attorney.  
It was this very catch-22 that led Congress to immunize potential whistle-
blowers. Prior to passage of the DTSA, courts recognized a limited public poli-
                                                        
4  18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (2012). 
5  18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
6  See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D). 
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cy privilege to disclose trade secrets.8 But uncertainty about the existence, 
scope, and requirements of a public policy defense and imposing on lay whis-
tleblowers, as some courts had, the requirement of demonstrating that they pro-
vided only “relevant” information was viewed as undermining the important 
public purpose of encouraging whistleblowers to come forward. The DTSA re-
gime, which provides employees and contractors a clear, straightforward, and 
reasonable procedure for consulting counsel, serves the
4
paramount public in-
terest in promoting law enforcement and ferreting out corporate fraud while 
providing appropriate protection for legitimate trade secrets. 
In concluding its opinion, the court notes that “no whistleblower suit has 
been filed. Unum does not know what Loftus took or what he is going to do 
with it. Loftus’s self-help discovery and threat of potential action in the future 
are not mitigated by the existence of an actual lawsuit.” Yet virtually all whis-
tleblower cases begin this way. The False Claims Act, for example, authorizes 
a relator to submit material evidence and information to the government under 
seal and to file a complaint under seal and without providing it to the defendant 
while the government investigates the allegations.9 The purpose of the seal is to 
protect the government’s investigation,10 which routinely (and ideally) occurs 
without notice to the defendant. 
III.  TURNING IMMUNITY ON ITS HEAD 
The court’s overbroad remedial order turns Congress’ immunity regime on 
its head. The court’s preliminary injunction orders Loftus and his counsel to 
turn over all Unum documents—whether in print or electronic form—to the 
court, destroy all copies of Unum documents, and to not make any copies of 
Unum documents. The court ordered Loftus to not deliver any Unum docu-
ments to any third party (presumably including the government) without the 
express permission of the court. The court further ordered Loftus and his coun-
sel to file an affidavit setting forth whether Unum documents have been given 
to any third party, and, if so, the circumstances under which said documents 
were given.  
The court’s order also undermines the very investigatory and reporting ac-
tivities specifically authorized by the DTSA, the False Claims Act, the Dodd–
Frank Act, and various other whistleblower statutes and protections. These 
statutes have detailed provisions that allow the government and whistleblowers 
to investigate potential violations of law without the knowledge or interference 
of the target company. Yet, in misconstruing the DTSA’s whistleblower im-
                                                        
8  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) 
(noting that the exception “depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, including 
the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the means by which the ac-
tor acquired the information”); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to 
Trade Secret Protection, 105 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017). 
9  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). 
10  See State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S.Ct. 436, 443 
(2016). 
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munity regime, the court has effectively provided Unum with pre-investigation 
discovery of potential regulatory violations and has effectively commandeered 
such investigation. 
IV.  FAITHFUL, BALANCED IMPLEMENTATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER IMMUNITY 
In addressing the dilemma of encouraging law enforcement while protect-
ing trade secrets, Congress granted employees and contractors immunity so 
long as they follow a clear and straightforward process. They may share com-
pany documents with their attorneys in confidence for the purpose of investi-
gating allegedly illegal corporate activity or pursuing a retaliation claim. Em-
ployers may not pursue trade secret liability for such confidential disclosures. 
The purpose of the whistleblower immunity regime is clear: Trade secret law 
may not be used to hide allegedly illegal conduct or discourage investigation of 
such matters. By choosing immunity, Congress shifted the law and legal pro-
cess from the employer’s advantage to the employee’s and the public’s. 
The court’s sole role in a case such as Unum Group v. Loftus is to decide 
whether immunity applies, with due regard for the DTSA’s protected activities 
and public purposes. Where, as here, the employee asserts under oath that he 
disclosed company documents to government officials or an attorney in confi-
dence solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation 
of law, the DTSA whistleblower regime requires the employer-trade secret 
owner to come forward with concrete evidence that the employee or contractor 
has shared trade secret information outside of the protected categories or for an 
impermissible purpose. Absent such evidence, the employee-contractor remains 
free to work with counsel to investigate and report alleged violations of law and 
immune from suit for trade secret violations. 
